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Abstract: This article argues that the beast whose spectre W.B. 
Yeats raises in “The Second Coming” has been a constant pres-
ence in Nigerian writing. It discusses two early manifestations of 
this beast, as they appear in Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart 
and Peter Nwana’s Omenuko, and focuses on the problem of 
abominations, particularly suicides, in traditional Igbo culture. 
In so doing, it contests Adélékè Adéèkó’s assertion that Nigerian 
writers continually return to the conclusion of Things Fall Apart 
because of “dissatisfaction with Okonkwo’s failure to negotiate 
historical transition” (“Okonkwo” 84). This article argues that, 
while Adéèkó is right that Nigerian writers frequently return to 
Things Fall Apart, they do so because Okonkwo’s body is both lit-
erally and metaphorically an abomination that cannot be buried. 
As such, it anticipates what the historical transition brings: mere 
anarchy.

Ezebuilo: a king is an enemy
-Common Igbo given name1
The title of Chinua Achebe’s first novel, Things Fall Apart, could serve as 
a generic subtitle for virtually any narrative from Genesis to, say, Great 
Expectations; things always, at some point, fall apart. In Achebe’s story, 
however, things do not get put back together again. They may, in fact, 
never get put back together again; Things Fall Apart shares with the 
poem that supplies its title a suspicion that the thing born in the desert 
is a beast of pure negation. That is, the second coming anticipated in 
William Butler Yeats’ poem is axiomatically not the second coming of 
Revelations. That coming, however terrifying, will be a restoration of 
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that which has fallen apart; Yeats’ is an inversion, the birth of the super-
man or anti-man who, though moved by the will to power, will restore 
neither grace nor lost natural human virility2 but merely release the cata-
strophic energy produced by the suspension of law.
This beast, sometimes seen clearly, sometimes registering only as a dis-
turbance amongst the desert birds, has been a constant presence in post-
colonial Nigerian writing. It appears in sharp focus in Wole Soyinka’s A 
Play of Giants, for example, in which Field-Marshal Kamini is modeled 
explicitly on Idi Amin and, to borrow Soyinka’s description of Amin 
himself, is “not so much human as anti-man” (Soyinka, “The Anti-Man 
Cometh” 45). But it is also present in texts such as Nkem Nwankwo’s 
Danda. Although Danda does not feature a character who might be 
called an anti-man (Danda is a charismatic idler and buffoon),3 it nev-
ertheless finds abominations at every turn; the accumulation of these 
moral failures eventually registers as the loosing of Yeats’ “mere anarchy” 
on the world despite the novel’s light tone (Yeats 211). Obviously, I 
cannot make a comprehensive case for this observation here, but I will 
make a start by discussing two early manifestations of the beast as it 
appears in Achebe’s Things Fall Apart and Peter Nwana’s Omenuko, an 
Igbo novel that pre-dates Things Fall Apart by twenty-five years. This 
discussion will respond to two articles by Adélékè Adéèkó, which to-
gether offer an intertextual reading of Achebe’s Arrow of God and Wole 
Soyinka’s Death and the King’s Horseman. At the risk of using Adéèkó 
rather unfairly, I will enumerate several objections to his reading, on the 
way to arguing that the protagonists of Things Fall Apart and Omenuko 
are not anti-colonial heroes so much as premonitions of the postcolonial 
beast, slouching toward Bethlehem. 
Both Arrow of God and Death and the King’s Horseman, Adéèkó 
argues, are “end-of-era stories about colonial conquest” that “find the 
conclusion of Things Fall Apart unsatisfying and therefore keep . . . re-
imagining it” (Adéèkó, “Okonkwo” 72–73). His reading hinges on the 
observation that, in both Achebe’s and Soyinka’s texts, “the protagonists 
disappear and the communities continue because the leading men speak 
and act for the aspirations of specific segments of the society whose 
claims to hegemonic power have been repudiated by the colonial order” 
51
Bea s t s  and  Abomina t i on s
and that “tragic closure (or avoidance thereof ) in these stories subli-
mates the waning power of class factions and not just the defeat of a few 
strong men” (Adéèkó, “Okonkwo” 73). Adéèkó argues that while Things 
Fall Apart shows a “disjuncture between the hero’s tragic ending and 
the continuous story of the larger community that baffles storytelling,” 
Olunde’s death in Death and the King’s Horseman “is untragic; his society 
expects it” (Adéèkó, “Okonkwo” 79). In this way, “Soyinka’s play recon-
figures . . . the insufficient attention Okonkwo gives to the law-making 
element of forceful will” (“Okonkwo” 84). 
At the heart of his analysis is what Adéèkó calls “the Okonkwo topos 
in Nigerian writing” (“Okonkwo” 73), the figure who “worries about the 
future, in contrast to the anti- Okonkwo, who acts as though tomorrow 
does not exist . . . and cares about communal sustenance [whereas] the 
anti-Okonkwo cares only for selfish libidinal pleasures” (“Great Books” 
40). Confronted with colonial commandement, he “prefers death to the 
humiliation of ceding self-governance to foreigners” (“Great Books” 
37). I certainly agree with Adéèkó’s assessment of the importance of 
an “Okonkwo topos” in Nigerian writing. Adéèkó notes its presence in 
Ben Okri’s The Famished Road, Chris Abani’s Graceland, Chimamanda 
Ngozi Adichie’s Purple Hibiscus, and Helon Habila’s Waiting for an Angel, 
and I agree, although I suspect we have different characters in mind as 
“Okonwko types,” because I take issue with Adéèkó’s assessment of what 
the topos means and why it has so often been revisited. In fact, I object 
to the argument Adéèkó builds around the topos on several counts.
First, there are problems with the contrast Adéèkó makes between 
Things Fall Apart and Death and the King’s Horseman and the conclusions 
that he draws from it. Adéèkó reads Okonkwo’s and Olunde’s suicides as 
straightforwardly intertextual and does not account for the differences 
between the two. Okonkwo is Igbo and Olunde is Yoruba. They come 
from different cultures that hold extremely different views on suicide. 
As Adéèkó notes, ritual suicide was an accepted part of Yoruba culture 
both before and during the colonial period, and title holders were often 
expected “to commit suicide upon the death of the king in order to 
accompany him to the hereafter” (Adeboye 199). Olufunke Adeboye 
observes that “politically motivated suicide” was both acceptable and 
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sometimes even valorized, a cultural attitude reflected in the saying “‘iku 
ya j’esin’ (death is preferable to ignominy)” (190). Suicide is also drama-
tized in the myth of Sango, orisha of lightning, who became a god only 
after committing suicide to avoid the ignominy of defeat and exile.4 In 
everyday and non-aristocratic cases, certainly, suicide “was considered 
abominable and a pollution of the community” (Adeboye 197), but the 
practice was “valorized . . . among the elite whenever it occurred within 
the context of a political contest or as a ritual obligation” (197).5 This is 
the situation in T.M. Aluko’s His Worshipful Majesty, for example. Faced 
with the ignominy of being dethroned by the colonial government, Oba 
Olayiwola Adegoke kills himself; Bada, the king’s horseman, promptly 
“[follows] his royal master on his way to the Land-of-the-Dead” (Aluko 
175). Both deaths are recognized as honourable.
This is the Yoruba context in which Olunde’s and Elesin’s suicides 
occur in Death and the King’s Horseman. In the play, set during World 
War Two, the British District Officer prevents Elesin, an already waver-
ing king’s horseman, from performing ritual suicide. In order to avoid 
catastrophe, Elesin’s son Olunde replaces his father in the ritual and 
accompanies his king into the world of the spirits. He will be honoured 
by the community and will, no doubt, eventually be reborn. Elesin, al-
though he does so belatedly, also commits honourable suicide and follows 
Olunde and the king. Admittedly, his “passage is clogged with droppings 
from the King’s stallion; he will arrive all stained in dung” (Soyinka, 
Death 76), but what is important is that he will arrive: “However sunk 
in debt he is no pauper’s carrion abandoned on the road” (Death 76). 
He is not, as Tejumola Olaniyan suggests, dispatched “into perpetual 
oblivion” (103). That is, he commits suicide to avoid consigning him-
self to perpetual oblivion. Had he not committed suicide, he would 
have become, like Oba Ovonramwen in Ola Rotimi’s Ovonramwen 
Nogbaisi, homo sacer “pitiably hiding in the shrubs, a cowering wretch” 
(Olaniyan 104). Adéèkó’s use of Yoruba proverbs as subtitles suggests 
that this is the context with which he is most familiar and from which 
he generalizes. It is not, however, the context in which Okonkwo’s sui-
cide occurs in Things Fall Apart. Igbo culture has no place for ritual or 
politically motivated suicide; all suicides are considered abominable of-
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fenses against the earth,6 comparable in seriousness to “patricide, incest, 
stealing of yams and sheep, bestiality, willful abortion . . . and the killing 
of sacred animals” (Arinze 34).7 Traditionally the body of a person who 
committed suicide was discarded in the “bad bush” along with other 
inhuman things, his spirit was lost, and he could neither join the ances-
tors (not even “all stained in dung”) nor be reborn. Such is the fate of 
Madume in Elechi Amadi’s The Concubine. He, like Achebe’s Okonwo, 
hangs himself; he is cut down by strangers and taken to “the forest into 
which bodies rejected by the earth were thrown” (Amadi 76). Whereas 
Olunde’s ritual suicide in Death and the King’s Horseman is, to borrow 
Émile Durkheim’s terms, altruistic, a martyrdom, Okonkwo’s is anomic 
and, perhaps more importantly, egoistic, a final rejection of all social 
and moral obligations.8 In the world depicted by Things Fall Apart, 
Okonkwo’s suicide could never be anything else. 
It is misleading, then, to suggest that Death and the King’s Horseman 
“reconfigures . . . the insufficient attention Okonkwo gives to the law-
making element of forceful will” (Adéèkó, “Okonkwo” 84). In fact, it 
is a mistake to suggest that Okonkwo is in any sense a figure of law-
making violence. He is, rather, to use Giorgio Agamben’s term, a figure 
of pure violence, “violence that exposes and severs the nexus between 
law and violence and can thus appear in the end not as violence that 
governs . . . but as violence that purely acts and manifests” (Agamben, 
State of Exception 62). One could hardly ask for a more apt descrip-
tion of the violence of Okonkwo’s murder of the court messenger at 
the end of the novel. My second objection, then, is to Adéèkó’s sugges-
tion that Okonkwo is representative of a traditional ruling class whose 
power, confronted with colonial commandement, is waning. Here I 
partly follow Neil ten Kortenaar, who argues that “[t]he problem that 
Okonkwo is designed to solve for his author is the problem faced by the 
new citizens of Nigeria who took over the commandement” (Kortenaar, 
“Things” 168; emphasis added). For Kortenaar, Things Fall Apart “testi-
fies not to 1900, when the novel is approximately set, but to 1958, on 
the eve of Nigerian independence” (“Things” 168). Okonkwo is not a 
representative of a traditional ruling class but a harbinger of something 
new, “a father figure wielding all the authority of the British” (“Things” 
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169). The characteristic feature of this new thing is that he “wants to 
be his own ancestor . . . [H]e wants to step outside the human genera-
tions and to deny paternity, both his father’s and his own responsibility 
as father” (Kortenaar, “Oedipus” 195–96). I argue that this new thing, 
Okonkwo, is the beast that Yeats anticipates in “The Second Coming,” a 
beast of no nation whose power is, in the language of Achille Mbembe, 
merely necropower. 
The colonial commandement that Kortenaar recognizes Okonkwo as 
symbolic of is, Mbembe argues, the source and prototype of contempo-
rary necropolitical power, “the absolute power to give death any time, 
anywhere, by any means, and for any reason” (Mbembe 13), or, one 
should add, for no reason at all. Indeed the closer violence approaches 
unreason, the more it becomes something that “purely acts and mani-
fests” (Agamben, State of Exception 62). Its first defining feature is that 
it is “based on a régime d’exception – that is, a regime that depart[s] 
from the common law” (Mbembe 29), or, as Achebe puts it, a regime 
which is “the end of government itself, where government leaps beyond 
the precipice, dismisses itself, and joins ranks with crime” (There Was a 
Country 248). It entails “a form of sovereignty drawing some features 
from royal power” (Mbembe 29), inasmuch as royal or sovereign power 
is, as Thomas Hobbes says, perpetually in “a posture of War” (Hobbes, 
Leviathan 90). Mbembe writes that “such sovereignty rather resembles 
the supposed ‘state of nature,’ allowing itself to do whatever it wishes” 
(34). Agamben clarifies this idea: this “state of nature” is “a principle 
internal to the State revealed in the moment in which the State is con-
sidered ‘as if it were dissolved’” (Agamben, Homo Sacer 36). Agamben 
adds, “[it] is . . . not so much a war of all against all as, more precisely, 
a condition in which everyone is bare life and a homo sacer for everyone 
else” (Homo Sacer 106; emphasis in original). It is also, therefore a con-
dition in which all violence is sovereign, unencumbered by law, and po-
litically impotent, incapable of making law. Under such circumstances, 
the people who govern themselves by Hobbes’ covenants of mutual trust 
inevitably lose all conviction, and those who have already announced 
themselves as beasts of no nation are filled with a passionate intensity. In 
Things Fall Apart, Okonkwo quite explicitly plays the role of the latter 
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when, without consulting the people of Umuofia, he goes to war and 
kills the court messenger. It is an exercise of an irrational will to power, 
an act whose very nature must appear incomprehensible to those still 
humanized by covenants of mutual trust. “Why did he do it?” Umuofia 
asks (Achebe, TFA 145). It is the only possible response to Okonkwo’s 
abomination. 
Two observations follow: first, concerning Adéèkó’s assumption that 
Nigerian authors continually return to the “unsatisfying” ending of 
Things Fall Apart (and to the Okonkwo topos) in order to re-imagine it 
and end the story in a more satisfying way. Adéèkó sets out to explain 
what he sees as a problematic “disjuncture between the leaders’ final 
decisions and the resolution of the societies to persist after conquest” 
(“Okonkwo” 73), and between “the hero’s tragic ending and the con-
tinuous story of the larger community” (“Okonkwo” 79). In doing so, 
he makes two assumptions: that Okonkwo’s death is tragic and that it 
represents an ending. However, decades of student essays and CliffsNotes 
written from a Westernized perspective notwithstanding, no suicide can 
ever, in the Igbo context, be properly tragic. The death of a tragic hero 
is by definition cathartic; it is cleansing or expiatory (the root of the 
word is katharos, “pure”). Okonkwo’s suicide, by contrast, is an abomi-
nation; his body is thought to be so evil that “only strangers may touch 
it” (Achebe, TFA 147). Certainly his death is pitiable. As his friend 
Obierika observes, Okonkwo “was one of the greatest men in Umuofia 
. . . and now he will be buried like a dog” (TFA 147). This is a lamenta-
ble turn of events, but it is not tragic. When a tragic hero dies, his suc-
cessor says, “Let four captains/Bear Hamlet, like a soldier, to the stage” 
(Shakespeare 5.2.397–398); he does not say, “He will be buried like a 
dog.” In other words, the perplexing problem of the ending of Things 
Fall Apart is not that it aims at a satisfying closure and fails but that it 
does not aim at closure at all.
In fact, Okonkwo’s death is a perverse birth. In death he becomes the 
embodiment of the abominable violence with which he has threatened 
Umuofia throughout the novel. The first inkling of this violence occurs 
when Okonkwo breaks the sacred peace of the Week of Peace, some-
thing “unheard of” in Umuofia (Achebe, TFA 22). He then kills his 
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adopted son, “the kind of action for which the goddess wipes out whole 
families” (TFA 46), in an act of capricious human sacrifice. The capri-
ciousness of the act is significant. In Igboland, human sacrifices were 
made only “in exceptional circumstances” (Arinze 89). Such sacrifices 
were offered when “a very serious public good was at stake, [during] 
a persistent epidemic or influenza (as that of 1918) .  .  . when a great 
public disaster from a spirit was felt to be imminent, or at the conclu-
sion of a peace treaty after an inter-town war” (Arinze 90). None of 
these conditions are present when the Oracle of the Hills demands, and 
Okonkwo provides, the sacrifice of Ikemefuna. There has been peace 
for three years, harvests have been good (the New Yam Festival has just 
been celebrated), and the British have barely appeared on the horizon. 
The arbitrariness of the sacrifice—no explanation at all is given for it—
suggests that something is out of joint in Umuofia. And Okonkwo is, 
of course, at the heart of it. 
Okonkwo is again at the centre of capricious violence when he ac-
cidentally kills a clansman. Ironically, this occurs when his gun explodes 
at a funeral, turning a ritual designed to facilitate the passage of the dead 
into an abomination.9 And, finally, he murders the court messenger. 
In each case, he acts alone in a way that sets him progressively further 
apart from the community and makes him increasingly dangerous to its 
continuity. He is widely called, with approbation, the “Roaring Flame,” 
but even Okonkwo knows that “Living fire begets cold, impotent ash” 
(Achbe, TFA 108–09). 
Okonwko’s death does not end the danger to the community; at the 
end of the novel, the abomination Okonkwo represents has yet to be 
dealt with. That is why it is an event to which Nigerian writing so often 
returns. Indeed, Things Fall Apart actually returns to it itself; Nwana’s 
Omenuko, the first novel in Igbo, approached the problem several years 
earlier. Arguably, discussions of the threat can be traced to even earlier 
narratives. Things Fall Apart dramatizes its own return to a problem con-
fronted by traditional Igbo storytelling when Okonkwo’s wife Ekwefi 
tells the story of the Tortoise and the birds’ feast. In the story, the trick-
ster Tortoise’s actions threaten the destruction of the community and 
nearly lead to his death. But I think Okonkwo and Omenuko represent 
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something new, something more difficult to understand than the anti-
social violence of the trickster. Here it will be useful to discuss Omenuko 
in some detail.
Omenuko is a fictionalization of the life of Chief Igwegbe Odum, 
whose praise name was Omenuko Aku, “he who displays largess in 
times of great scarcity” (Nnolim 28). The novel tells the story of the titu-
lar character’s shrewd rise to power in early twentieth-century Igboland, 
and there is certainly something about Omenuko that is amorally ap-
pealing in the same way that the Tortoise is appealing. Throughout the 
novel, Omenuko is consistently one step ahead of those around him; he 
cunningly manipulates and anticipates both his enemies and allies. As 
Frances Pritchett observes in the preface to her translation of the text, 
Omenuko’s popularity, even today, hinges partly on his adroitness at 
“exploiting both the British colonial officials and the traditional prac-
tices of his home area.”10 The novel’s precipitating event even sounds 
like a trickster story, insofar as it involves a ludicrously shortsighted, 
greed-motivated miscalculation on Omenuko’s part. He sells his carri-
ers and apprentices—including some of his own relatives—into slavery, 
ostensibly in an effort to recoup his losses when his market-bound goods 
are swept away by a swollen river. 
However, more than mere tricksterism takes place in the novel. 
Having committed one abomination, Omenuko returns to his village, 
Ezi Nnachi, and undertakes another; he plans “for himself and the chiefs 
and the fathers of the children he had sold to die all at the same time, by 
lighting a fire in two containers of gunpowder and placing them under 
his loincloth” (Ch.1). The relationship between the two abominations is 
significant. Omenuko’s despair over the first does not lead to the second; 
instead, the first is a pretext for the second. Omenuko’s misery over his 
lost wealth makes him wish for death; selling his people is merely a way 
to ensure that death. He explains to his brothers: 
They had all then fallen into the river and since God in Heaven 
saved everyone, no one drowned, but all of his goods had been 
lost. Their ancestors and God in Heaven had saved his life, but 
death would have been better. He went on to say, “On account 
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of this, death is better than life to me just now, and I will surely 
die. Therefore, you both must start looking for your own salva-
tion [from the townspeople’s anger], because for my part I am 
prepared to die.” (Ch. 2)
In other words, Omenuko threatens the community with general de-
struction. This is not the act of a trickster. The Tortoise may do damage 
in his search for advantage, he often causes a breach in the social order 
that must be corrected, and his bad behaviour may even seem to threaten 
the existence of the community, but only ever by way of ultimately af-
firming its continuity. As Achebe observes, “He is a rogue, but he is a 
nice kind of rogue. . . . He’s not allowed to get away with murder. He 
does something and he is punished, but he still lives to appear again. . . . 
Tortoise is wicked, but he is not irredeemably so. Tortoise is not evil. 
He’s just naughty” (qtd. in Baker and Draper 22). Murder-suicide, then, 
is quite definitively not part of a trickster’s remit. Omenuko threatens 
to become something other than a trickster in the moment in which he 
contemplates the second abomination. 
In a much-referenced interview with Bill Moyers, Achebe speaks 
about the Igbo proverb “[w]herever something stands, something else 
will stand beside it.” He says that “[i]t means that there is no one way 
to anything. The Igbo people who made that proverb are very insistent 
on this—there is no absolute anything. They are against excess—their 
world is a world of dualities” (“Chinua Achebe”). The choice of the 
term “dualities” is perhaps unfortunate, suggesting to some commenta-
tors a world of Manichean binaries. Adéèkó, for example, applies the 
proverb to Okonkwo, who lacks “duality” and forgets “that gruffness 
should be balanced with amiability, rigidity with softness, masculinity 
with femininity” (“Great Books” 40). David Whittaker and Mpalive-
Hangson Msiska, however, are more on point when they interpret the 
proverb Moyers and Achebe discuss to mean that “wherever something 
exists there will always be a complementary or opposing force beside it” 
(45; emphasis added). Complementarity comprises both contradiction 
and addition, completion by apposition as well as by opposition. The 
thing that “stands beside” does not simply balance but modulates, con-
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textualizes, and makes meaningful. As Whittaker and Msiska write, “In 
Igbo thought, nothing can exist in its own terms” (45). And yet, Achebe 
remarks in another interview, there is also “Something That Doesn’t 
Even Wear a Necklace,” that is, something for which there is no second 
presence—not even a necklace—something that exists entirely on its 
own terms. That thing is, Achebe observes, “a complete picture of evil” 
(qtd. in Baker and Draper 23). It is this “Something That Doesn’t Even 
Wear a Necklace,” a thing “completely alone,” that Omenuko threatens 
to become. 
Pritchett argues that Omenuko is able to “reconcile two worlds”: the 
world of the traditional Igbo village and the world of the colonial British 
(Pritchett, “Translator’s Preface”). I am not sure, however, that this is the 
case. At certain points Omenuko does, as Pritchett observes, success-
fully exploit two worlds, but only at the expense of belonging to nei-
ther, and at the risk of becoming a thing completely alone. Significantly, 
Omenuko is prevented from definitively becoming this evil thing by his 
brothers, who persuade him to abandon his suicidal plan and flee with 
the rest of the family to another village. The remainder of the story, in its 
broadest outlines, is an account of Omenuko’s redemption and eventual 
return to his home village. Through shrewdness and eloquence, he grows 
wealthy during his exile in Ndi Mgoborogwu, becomes acting-chief of 
the village, and is eventually chief of his own, new-founded village, Ikpa 
Oyi. He then uses his wealth to buy the freedom of those he once sold 
into slavery and perform the expiatory rites that permit his return to Ezi 
Nnachi. There he eventually becomes “a man of the people . . . doing 
good deeds all his life long” (Ch. 15). As Nwana’s introduction explains, 
this narrative affirms the deeply-held Igbo belief that “if anyone goes to 
another town and lives there as a guest . . . he will always be reminded 
that he is a guest in that land and he will be preparing himself for his 
inevitable return to the town of his birth .  .  . [where his] people will 
welcome his return” (Introduction). But Omenuko’s story has a shadow, 
this something-that-doesn’t-even-wear-a-necklace.
Omenuko becomes chief of Ndi Mgborogwu when his predecessor 
dies without an adult male heir and tentatively designates Omenuko 
regent—tentatively because such an appointment is entirely at the dis-
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cretion of the District Commissioner. Omenuko becomes a Warrant 
Chief, a position invented by the British to facilitate Indirect Rule in an 
area that traditionally did not have a centralized power structure. The 
Warrant Chief system was introduced in the 1890s, “[making] mush-
room kings grow where there [were] none before,” as Achebe writes 
in Arrow of God (70). The system was generally seen by the Igbos as 
an unwanted imposition, and the result, Elizabeth Isichei notes, was 
that very often “the Warrant Chiefs were not the traditional elders of a 
town. These tended to suspect the Greeks bearing gifts and put forward 
junior members of the community or even slaves” (161). This situa-
tion is dramatized in Arrow of God when Ezeulu, chief priest of the 
village of Umuaro, refuses the British Administration’s warrant because 
“Ezeulu will not be anybody’s chief, except Ulu” (Achebe, Arrow 215). 
James Ikedi, on the other hand, “who had been among the very first 
people to receive missionary education” and was not a person of im-
portance in his own town (Arrow 69), seizes the opportunity and earns 
himself the title “Destroyer of Compounds” (Arrow 69). The District 
Officer, Captain Winterbottom, observes Chief Ikedi’s corruption and 
wonders how a “blood brother” of the people could treat them so vi-
ciously (70). He decides it must be a “cruelty of a kind which Africa 
alone produced” (70). Winterbottom is, of course, wrong. Chief Ikedi’s 
cruelty—like Okonkwo’s violence—is an entirely novel kind that can 
be produced only in the no-man’s land between Africa and the British 
Administration.11 Isichei writes: 
[The Warrant Chiefs’] abuse of office, which was to become 
legendary in the colonial period, was perhaps due less to their 
inexperience than to the novelty of their roles. Positions of re-
sponsibility of traditional society were surrounded by a net-
work of duties, expectations and obligations. These were 
known both to the incumbent and to society as a whole. If he 
failed to fulfill them, he would feel the weight of popular dis-
approval, and the community would apply various sanctions 
against him. The Warrant Chief filled a new role, upon which 
traditional practices could shed no light. He was responsible, 
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less to the community he served, than to the colonial master, 
who alone had power to dismiss him. It was perhaps inevi-
table that the Warrant Chiefs tended to use their positions for 
personal aggrandizement. In a world of rapid change, of con-
flicting values and of manifold uncertainties, perhaps personal 
prosperity seemed the one thing certain. (161)
The narrator of Omenuko sings a praise song for Omenuko as chief of 
Ndi Mgoborogwu: “He was a friend to the poor and the rich alike. . . . 
Because of Omenuko’s good deeds toward his fellow men, no one re-
membered that he was a stranger in the land he was governing, nor 
did anyone remember that it was Obiefula’s Warrant that Omenuko 
was using to govern the land” (Ch. 6). But the praise is undercut at 
every turn by recent history. Whatever Omenuko’s (un-enumerated) 
good deeds, his position as a Warrant Chief identifies him as part of a 
discredited institution. This is no mere subtextual element that may or 
may not be pertinent. Omenuko was published in 1933, four years after 
fifty-five women were killed by colonial troops during the “Women’s 
War,” a series of mass demonstrations against the Warrant Chief system. 
The government report on the uprising concluded that the Warrant 
Chief system was illegitimate and recommended a total reorganization 
of the administration. As a result, “[b]y 1935 many different forms of 
native administration existed in southeastern Nigeria, most based to 
some extent on clan or village councils, and these forms of administra-
tion were much more in tune with traditional political models” (Falola 
and Heaton 133). Coming in the middle of this revolution, the narra-
tor’s praise of a Warrant Chief who, by the narrator’s own reckoning, 
“amassed far more wealth than he had when he lived in our town,” 
sounds distinctly hollow (Ch. 6). 
Hollow too is the observation that “no one remembered that he was 
a stranger” (Ch. 6). This does not mean that anyone actually forgets he 
is a stranger, only that, so long as his chieftancy is not too onerous or 
inconvenient, no one feels the need to remind him that he is a stranger. 
But the village elders continue to meet behind Omenuko’s back, and as 
soon as Mgoborogwu’s son is of age, they tell Omenuko that the war-
62
Hugh  Hodge s
rant is not his. Omenuko puts on a display of indignation and laments, 
“[Y]ou have counted me out from among you and set me apart as a 
stranger. Because of this it will be better for me if I remain indeed 
a stranger” (Ch. 6). Yet he is already maneuvering to secure himself 
another warrant and persuades the District Commissioner to make 
him chief of a new settlement. His new village is, significantly, lo-
cated in “bad bush,” a stretch of evil forest where abominations are 
disposed of: “[T]hose who had died of swollen bellies, those who had 
hydrocele, those who were killed by smallpox” (Ch. 6). The narra-
tor observes that Omenuko now holds “his own Warrant instead of 
one belonging to someone else,” but this is truly an ironic ascendancy 
(Ch. 7). He is now the illegitimate chief of abominations; the shadow 
of something-that-doesn’t-even-wear-a-necklace surrounds him. As 
Omenuko himself notes, reflecting on this period of his life, “I was 
not one of the Mgborogwu, nor did I belong to the people of our 
land” (Ch. 8).
Omenuko’s return from this bad bush to Ezi Nnachi entails, first, 
the reclamation of the people he sold into slavery. This process and the 
various transactions it involves are detailed in the longest chapter of the 
novel (nearly one quarter of the book); Nwana’s intention, presumably, 
is to emphasize the scale of Omenuko’s labour. The symbolic value of his 
labour is also emphasized by the fact that, when Omenuko undertakes 
his work—or rather employs one of his brothers to undertake it for 
him—the colonial government has already freed the slaves in Igboland. 
As Ezuma, one of the slave owners, acknowledges, “these are the times 
of the white man – if these children themselves want to go away, they 
can go, even if we do not agree that they should be bought back now. 
Perhaps it will cause trouble, and when they go home they will not pay 
any money at all” (Ch. 8). He is more than happy to return Omenuko’s 
kinsmen for exactly the price he paid. Omenuko’s purchase of his kins-
men, though unnecessary under colonial law, is thus doubly symbolic. 
It is both penitential labour and an honouring of contracts. The latter 
is more important than it may seem. To have simply gone from com-
pound to compound reclaiming kinsmen would have been to, once 
more, exploit two worlds while being part of neither.
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Second, Omenuko attempts to make ritual atonement for his abomi-
nation. Ernest Emenyonu observes that “Omenuko is required to offer 
a sacrifice of atonement in the highest terms ever prescribed” (88), but 
this is not the case. The sum of Omenuko’s sacrifice is “one female sheep, 
one hen, one cock, eight chicken eggs, a duck egg, a basket of yams, 
a basket of cocoyams, one pod of kola, one pod of kola pepper, forty 
pieces of native chalk, wine in a pot whose bottom has not touched the 
ground, a pot of raffia palm wine, a pot of oil palm wine, and an eagle” 
(Ch. 9). For a man of Omenuko’s wealth this represents a fairly insig-
nificant outlay, and indeed he freely offers more than is required by the 
priest Iyiukwa to “show how sincere he is” (Ch. 10). What matters is not 
the price of the sacrifice but the symbolism of its disposition:
[The people of Ezi Nnachi] would take a chicken egg, touch 
it to the mouth and throw it away, and some people would 
eat little bits of it. All of those things are involved in the ritual 
eating together of man and spirits. Those things would all be 
killed and cooked, everyone would eat a little bit of them, each 
item in turn, from the first person to the last, at the same time. 
(Ch. 9)
The cow, chickens, and yams are all used by Ezi Nnachi in “ritual 
eating together, in order to reconcile them from that day forward” (Ch. 
9). Community is affirmed and reconciliation is accomplished. But 
Omenuko’s return is not yet complete. Throughout the proceedings he 
lives in Ikpa Oyi and continues his ascent through the ranks of Warrant 
Chiefs to become Paramount Chief, much to the chagrin of the chiefs 
of the twenty-six villages under his warrant. They lament, “No, this will 
not happen in our land—a stranger being the head over all of us. If he 
is going to be the government, let him go to his own village—he will 
not stay in our village” (Ch. 12). The chiefs attempt various conspiracies 
against Omenuko, all of which are foiled, until things begin to get out of 
hand and several men are killed in a skirmish. At this point, the District 
Commissioner steps in and asks Omenuko to return to Ezi Nnachi to 
avoid further bloodshed. He adds, “I have not found anything against 
you that is so bad that [it] will cause you to lose your position of leader-
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ship. . . . [A]fter you have reached your land and have rested, when you 
want your warrant, come and see me so I can give you a paper which 
you will give to the District Commissioner” (Ch. 14). 
Significantly, despite entreaties from those around him, Omenuko 
never reclaims his warrant and forsakes his chieftainship in favour of be-
coming a beloved and forward-thinking “man of the people” (Ch. 15). 
A significant discrepancy between Nwana’s narrative and the biography 
on which it is based is worth noting. Chief Igwegbe Odum’s tenure as 
a warrant chief ended in 1918, not because he foreswore it but because 
the District Officer terminated it. After a police investigation, “Chief 
Igwegbe was publicly reprimanded in front of other chiefs . . . and he re-
tired discredited” (Nnolim 28). But this turn of events would not serve 
Nwana’s purpose. Omenuko only achieves closure if Omenuko willingly 
and purposefully rejects the chieftaincy which made him something-
that-doesn’t-even-wear-a-necklace. Although he makes sure that his 
children are educated and either set up in trade or placed in white collar 
jobs with the Railway Corporation, he remains ostensibly both a bul-
wark of the traditional community and a protector of its future.
This conclusion is, presumably, what Pritchett has in mind when she 
observes that Omenuko reconciles two worlds. However, as the discrep-
ancy between the novel and the biography suggests, this reconciliation 
and the closure it allows are factitious, achieved by hastily and improp-
erly burying the spectre the novel has raised. Things Fall Apart, by con-
trast, refuses closure; Okonkwo’s abomination cannot be buried (either 
literally, by the Igbo community it threatens, or metaphorically by the 
Nigerian writers who have, as Adéèkó says, tried to “re-imagine” the 
ending of Things Fall Apart (“Okonkwo” 73)). 
This, then, is what I identify as the “Okonkwo topos” to which 
Nigerian literature continually returns: not the figure Adéèkó reads, 
who “worries about the future” and “cares about communal sustenance” 
(“Great Books” 40), but the figure whose will to power is a thing beside 
which nothing stands, and who consequently threatens both the future 
and the community. Nigerian writing so often turns to this figure partly 
because, in the years since the publication of Things Fall Apart, men 
who seem to embody it have dominated Nigerian public life. Arguably, 
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this tendency reached its perfection with that “sheer carapace of bru-
tality” Sani Abacha (Soyinka, The Open Sore 106), but Fela Kuti had 
already diagnosed Muhammadu Buhari and his predecessors as “beasts 
of no nation” (Kuti). The creatures who emerged in the postcolony were 
born, as Mbembe observes, out of colonial commandement. Omenuko 
witnesses the birth, although Nwana seems to be—willfully or not—
unaware of it. Perhaps, as an early Christian convert and a teacher 
at a Methodist college, he was too much a part of commandement to 
recognize its progeny.12 Of course Achebe, son of an Anglican teacher 
and evangelist and a graduate of Government College, was every bit as 
imbricated in colonial commandement as Nwana. But Achebe seems to 
have retained what he identifies as a characteristically Igbo awareness of 
“the menace of those with the will to power” (There Was a Country 246). 
On the eve of independence, he saw it all too clearly, and the legacy of 
Things Fall Apart is not so much its reconstruction of a pre-colonial Igbo 
past as its anticipation of a postcolonial Nigerian future. 
Notes
 1 Achebe writes, “The Igbo have long been a very democratic people. They express 
a strong anti-monarchy sentiment with the common name Ezebuilo, which 
translates to ‘a king is an enemy’” (Achebe, “Nigeria’s Promise, Africa’s Hope”). 
 2 That is, not as Nietzsche supposes, something bred out of “the domestic animal, 
the herd animal” (Nietzsche 115–16), but to something that is created only 
when humanity is reduced to the animal. 
 3 As Lynn notes, “Danda explicitly identifies himself with the .  .  . Tortoise of 
Igbo folklore” (3); this identification with the Trickster, I argue, fundamentally 
distinguishes him from the beasts of no nation I discuss in this paper. 
 4 In Yoruba cosmology, God (Olodumare) takes no direct interest in mankind; 
humanity’s dealings with the spiritual world are limited to the ancestors and 
the lesser deities—orishas—who are facets of Olodumare. There are hundreds of 
orishas, many of them local, some of them—like Sango—universally recognized. 
 5 Several critics have pointed to the “inexorably reactionary” quality of this ideol-
ogy both historically and as it plays out in Nigerian drama (Olaniyan 106). See 
Jeyifo’s The Truthful Lie, Booth’s “Self-Sacrifice and Human Sacrifice in Soyinka’s 
Death and the King’s Horseman,”and Olaniyan’s “Suicide and Ideology.” 
 6 Arinze notes that “Ani, the Earth Spirit, and the ancestors are regarded as the 
special guardians of morality. Special grave moral faults are called ‘alu’ or ‘nso 
Ani’ (abomination)” (34).
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 7 The depiction of a funeral where a slave is “supposed to jump into the grave 
willingly, happy to accompany her mistress” in Emcheta’s The Joys of Motherhood 
(23) is dramatically effective but historically spurious. The killing of slaves “to 
give the deceased personality an honourable following of servants to accompany 
him to the great beyond” (Arinze 88) was not uncommon in nineteenth-century 
Igobland, but the slaves were victims, not willing ritual suicides (Law 72; Arinze 
89–91).
 8 Joiner and Rudd summarize Durkheim’s theory tidily: 
  Durkheim . . . identified four basic subtypes based on the environmental 
conditions surrounding suicide: 1) egoistic, 2) altruistic, 3) anomic, 4) fa-
talistic. He identified suicides occurring due to a lack of social integra-
tion as egoistic, while altruistic suicides were characterized by insufficient 
individuation and by “finding the basis for existence beyond earthly life” 
(e.g. religious martyrs . . .). According to Durkheim, anomic and fatalistic 
suicides were associated with situations involving deregulation .  .  . and 
hyperregulation . . . respectively. (Joiner and Rudd 54)
 9 Arinze observes that, at a funeral, “The more gun shots the better . . . to help the 
dead go much quicker to the spirit land” (14).
 10 Pritchett’s translation of Omenuko is available online through Columbia Univer-
sity. The document lacks pagination, but I will cite chapters. All quotations from 
Omenuko are from this online translation. 
 11 My point here is not that cruelty and suicide were unheard of in Igboland before 
the arrival of the British but that Winterbottom’s observation about Africans 
makes a convenient, self-serving mistake. It is the same mistake Major Arthur 
Glyn Leonard makes in The Lower Niger and Its Tribes (the real-life model for the 
book the District Commissioner is writing at the end of Things Fall Apart, and 
which Winterbottom subsequently reads in Arrow of God). In that book Major 
Leonard observes that “[Africans] will commit self-murder on the slightest prov-
ocation, even when they have been only abused or chaffed” (qtd. in Kortenaar, 
Postcolonial Literature 33). But the anomic violence Leonard (or, interchange-
ably, the District Commissioner or Winterbottom) takes to be a characteristic 
of Africans is, in fact, a characteristic and quite unprecedented effect of colonial 
commandement. 
 12 See Omenuko’s “The Author of Omenuko,” available online through Columbia 
University. 
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